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Florian Fischer Cascades of Collective Action
Florian Fischer 
Freie Universität Berlin
In time of social turbulence, we observe cascades o f collective action: people 
speak their mind in public, undertake acts o f civil disobedience, attend 
demonstrations, and participate in violent riots. Occasionally, a social movement 
gains momentum and overturns the status quo.
Susanne Lohmann, Collective Action Cascades (2000: 655)
Introduction
There's a joke that has been making the rounds in Egypt in recent weeks, and it 
goes something like this: Hosni Mubarak meets Anwar Sadat and Gamal Abdel 
Nasser, two fellow Egyptian presidents, in the afterlife. Mubarak asks Nasser 
how he ended up there. "Poison,” Nasser says. Mubarak then turns to Sadat.
"How did you end up here?” he asks. "An assassin's bullet,” Sadat says. "What 
about you?” To which Mubarak replies: "Facebook.”1
What this joke illustrates is a question which journalistic and academic circles have been 
debating in recent years: how important is the role of social media and information and 
communication technology (ICT) in endangering and, in some cases, ultimately toppling long­
standing dictators and their regimes? This debate has gained significance -  and practical- 
political relevance -  since the end of 2010, when a wave of public uprisings started cascading 
through the Arab World, ultimately transforming the region through fundamental political 
changes, while possibly influencing international political structures on a wider scale. Portrayed 
as being sparked by a single incident in a small Tunisian town,2 the developments in Northern 
Africa and the Middle East that -  so far (May 2011) -  led to the ousting of long-standing 
autocrats in Tunisia and Egypt,3 and are threatening equally long-standing autocratic rulers in 
other Arab countries (Bahrain, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Algeria), have in various instances been 
dubbed "Twitter-” and "Facebook-Revolutions”, or "Revolution 2.0” .4 The suggested notion, that
Hounshell, B. (2011, Feb. 14). Think Again: Egypt. From the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to the 
Arab Autocracy Domino Theory, Five Myths about Egypt's Revolution. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 15 May 
2011 from <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/14/think_again_egypt?page=0,0>.
Ryan, Y. (2011a, Jan. 20). The Tragic Life of a Street Vendor. A l Jazeera Online. Retrieved 15 April
2011 from <http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/01/201111684242518839.html>; Ryan, Y. 
(2011b, Jan. 26): How Tunisia's Revolution Began. Al Jazeera Online. Retrieved 15 April 2011 from: 
<http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/01/2011126121815985483.html>.
3
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali ruled Tunisia for 23 years, while Hosni Mubarak was President of Egypt for 29 
years.
4  L Malin, C. (2011, Jan. 16). Can We Say Twitter Revolution Now? Can We? Spot On Homepage.
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these developments have been caused or at least significantly influenced by social media tools 
such as Facebook or Twitter, is highly debated and mostly refuted. Most scholars and 
journalists alike, although agree that the use of social media has in the past decade become a 
factor in the formation and development of social movements and political protest in general, 
disagree on their size, origin, aim and motivation, as well as their geographical location and 
reach. Yet, there exists a gap in our knowledge about if and how social media and information 
and communication technology may be of relevance for the success of political protest in 
general, and in autocratic regimes specifically.
Clay Shirky is one of the proponents of the idea that social media and ICTs enhance 
the prospects of political protest to be successful by essentially making social and political 
information sharing, communication, and coordination easier.5 Shirky adopts the model of 
information cascades to argue for a positive impact of social media on political protests, 
specifically with regard to the struggle for democratization against autocratic regimes. 
Previously developed and applied by Susanne Lohmann in the 1990s to explain regime 
change through a series of political protests, the model of information cascades did not - and 
could not at that time - account for social media as a possibly contributing factor. The use of 
the model and the implications derived by Shirky thus demand further explanation.
With the interest to contribute to our understanding of the possible impact of social 
media on the success of political protests, this paper analyzes and compares the recent 
public uprisings in Egypt and Syria through the perspective of the model of information 
cascades, asking: Why were the public uprisings in Egypt successful in effecting regime 
change, while those in Syria did not have a similar effect so far?
Through the analysis of the recent events in Egypt and Syria, the model of information 
cascades is applied and tested with regard to the two relevant factors proposed by Lohmann 
and Shirky. While Lohmann originally argued that a sequence of several protests form an
Retrieved 15 April 2011 from <http://www.spotonpr.com/twitter-revolution-and-tunisia/>; Zuckerman, E. 
(2011, Jan. 14). The First Twitter Revolution? Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 15 April 2011 from 
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/14/the_first_twitter_revolution>; Ghonim, W. (2011, Mar.). 
Wael Ghonim: Inside the Egyptian Revolution [video file]. Retrieved 15 April 2011 from 
<http://blog.ted.com/2011/03/04/inside-the-egyptian-revolution-wael-ghonim-on-ted-com/>.
5
Shirky, C. (2008). Here Comes Everybody: The Power o f Organizing Without Organizations. New York, 
NY: Penguin Press; Shirky, C. (2009, Dec. 11). The Net Advantage. Prospect Magazine, 165. Retrieved 
16 April 2011 from <http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2009/12/the-net-advantage/>; Shirky, C. (2011, 
Jan./Feb.). The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political Change. 
Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 14 April 2011 from <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67038/clay- 
shirky/the-political-power-of-social-media>.
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information cascade may lead to the fall of a given regime,6 Shirky claims that the use of 
social media improve information cascades, thus enhancing the prospects of political protests 
to effect regime change.7 In line with Lohmann, we would thus expect that (hypothesis 1) the 
more political protest was manifested before a given moment, the more probable the success 
of subsequent political protest to effect regime change. We would further expect according to 
Shirky that (hypothesis 2) the more social media tools are used in a given regime, the more 
successful political protests can be in effecting regime change. The dependent variable 
"effected regime change” will thus be approached through the analysis of the number of 
previous protests (independent variable 1) and the degree of social media use (independent 
variable 2) in the two cases chosen. The number of previous protests in each country will be 
established through an adopted search of press agency reports in the full-text information 
service LexisNexis. The degree of social media use will be determined using a modified and 
updated version of the Digital Access Index developed by the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU).
By testing the model of information cascades through the analysis of the recent 
political uprisings in Egypt and Syria, this study aims not only at enhancing our knowledge of 
the model and its possible application(s), but also hopes to specifically shed light on how 
concise its adoption by Shirky is with regard to social media. At the same time, it may 
contribute to our understanding of the recent political developments in the Middle East. It is 
important to mention at this point, that this paper does not aim at a general explanation of the 
occurrence of political protest in Egypt or Syria. While factors such as economic performance 
and resource distribution,8 rising (food) prices,9 demographic changes in combination with
6  Lohmann, S. (1994a). Rationality, Revolution, and Revolt: The (Hap-) Hazards of Informational 
Cascades. Graduate School o f Business Studies Research Paper, No. 1213, Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University; Lohmann, S. (1994b). The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday 
Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-1991. World Politics, 47 (1), 42-101.
7 Shirky, Here Comes Everybody  Shirky, The Net Advantage.
8  Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J. (2005). Economic Origins o f Dictatorship and Democracy. New York: 
Cambridge University Press; Paciello, M. C. (2011). Egypt: Changes and Challenges of Political 
Transition. MEDPRO Technical Report, No. 4 (May 2011). Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels. 
For an interesting combination of Acemoglu and Robinson's approach with Lohmann's model of 
information cascades, see: Ellis, C. J. & Fender, J. (2010). Information Cascades and Revolutionary 
Regime Transitions. The Economic Journal, 121 (553), 763-792.
9  Hendrix, C., Haggard, S., Magaloni, B. (2009). Grievance and Opportunity: Food Prices, Political 
Regime, and Protest. Paper Prepared for Presentation at the International Studies Association 
convention. New York, February 15-18, 2009; Lowrey, A. (2011, Jan. 31). Protesting on an Empty 
Stomach: How the Egyptian Economy Is Fueling Unrest in Egypt. Slate Homepage. Retrieved 16 August
2 0 1 2  from
<http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2 0 1 1 /0 1 /protesting_on_an_empty_stomach.html>.
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(the lack of) educational and economic opportunities,10 as well as sectarian divisions11 can be 
considered as possibly having contributed to the occurrence and development of political 
protest in Egypt and Syria respectively, they will not be discussed in detail here due to the 
scope and focus of this study. Within the broad framework of collective action theory, this 
paper solely focuses on how political protests might be regarded as information cascades (as 
understood by Lohmann) and the impact social media might have on these (as proposed by 
Shirky).
To reach the stated aim, the paper is organized as follows: section (1) sets the frame 
of this paper, illustrating (1.1) some of the available literature on the topic, defining (1.2) the 
crucial terms and concepts used, and explaining (1.3) the theoretical framework and 
methodology adopted, as well as (1.4) the choice of the cases. Section (2) and (3) are 
dedicated to the analysis and discussion of the two independent variables chosen 
respectively. Finally, a closing chapter (Conclusion) summarizes the results of this analysis 
with regard to the given research question and the tested model, while stating problems 
encountered on the way and perspectives given as a result thereof.
10 Campante, F. R. & Chor, D. (2012). Why Was the Arab World Poised for Revolution? Schooling, 
Economic Opportunities, and the Arab Spring. Journal o f Economic Perspective, 26 (2), 167-188; El- 
Mahdi, R. (2009). Enough! Egypt's Quest for Democracy. Comparative Political Studies, 42 (8 ), 1011­
1039; LaGraffe, D. (2012). The Youth Bulge in Egypt: An Intersection of Demographics, Security, and the 
Arab Spring. Journal o f Strategic Security, 5 (2), 65-80; Paciello, M. C. (2011). Egypt: Changes and 
Challenges of Political Transition.
11 Lund, A. (2011). The Ghosts o f Hama: The Bitter Legacy o f Syria's Failed 1979-1982 Revolution. 
Swedish International Liberal Centre. Stockholm, Sweden; Lund, A. (2012). Divided They Stand: An 
Overview o f Syria's Political Opposition Factions. Foundation for European Progressive Studies & Olof 
Palme International Center. Uppsala, Sweden; Philipps, C. (2012). After the Arab Spring: Power Shift in 
the Middle East?: Syria’s Bloody Arab Spring. LSE IDEAS Reports - Special Reports, SR011. London, 
UK: London School of Economics and Political Science.
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1. Frame
1.1 L iterature Review
There exists an extensive body of literature with regard to the possible influence of 
media on processes of regime change and democratization in general,12 and in the Middle 
East specifically.13
Concerning the more specific question of the role social media could play and actually 
do play in political protests in authoritarian regimes, there is an on-going debate among 
scholars. As proponents of the idea that social media can have an overall positive influence 
on anti-regime protest, Garrett,14 Rheingold15 and Shirky16 theorize that the Internet and its 
associated tools reduce the costs of information sharing and communication, thereby 
reducing the barriers of group-formation and collective action; while Karpf17 argues that these 
tools allow for new forms of political organization. Though acknowledging the reduction in 
costs of communication and organization, scholars opposing the former opinions hold that 
digital technologies have little effect on the institutions of authoritarianism, as states have 
largely been successful in limiting access to information transmitted by these technologies, or 
even in repressing online dissent directly.18
1 2  Best, M. & Wade, K. (2009). The Internet and Democracy: Global Catalyst or Democratic Dud? Bulletin 
o f Science, Technology & Society, 29 (4), 255-271; Groschek, J. (2010). A Time-Series, Multinational 
Analysis of Democratic Forecasts and Internet Diffusion. International Journal o f Communication, 4, 142­
174; Kedzie, C. R. (1997). Communication and Democracy: Coincident Revolutions and the Emergent 
Dictator’s Dilemma. Santa Monia, CA: RAND.
1 3  Al Jenaibi, B. (2010). New Age of Press Democracy in the Middle East. Arabic News Channels: Al- 
Jazeera. International Journal o f Academic Research, 2(4), 385-394; Alterman, J.B. (2000, Jan.). The 
Middle East's Information Revolution. Current History, 21-26; Burkhart, G. E. & Older, S. (2003). The 
Information Revolution in the Middle East and North Africa. Santa Monia, CA: RAND; Eickelman, D. F. & 
Anderson, J. W. (1999) (eds). New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press; Wheeler, D. (2006). Empowering Publics: Information Technology 
and Democratization in the Arab World -  Lessons from Internet Cafés and Beyond. Research Report No.
11, Oxford: Oxford Internet Institute.
14 Garrett, R. K. (2006). Protest in an Information Society. A Review of Literature on Social Movements 
and New ICTs. Information, Communication & Society, 9 (2), 202-224.
1 5  Rheingold, H. (2003). Smart Mobs: The Power o f the Mobile Many. Cambridge, MA : Perseus 
Publications.
1 6  Shirky, Here Comes Everybody.
17 Karpf, D. (2008, Dec.). Understanding Blogspace. Journal o f Information Technology & Politics, 5 (4), 
369-385.
1 8  Etling, B., Faris, R. & Palfrey, J. (2010). Political Change in the Digital Age: The Fragility and Promise
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Interestingly, most references in this ongoing debate remain somewhat anecdotal,19 as 
little quantitative research is done on the impact of the Internet and social media on political 
protests in authoritarian regimes. Examples of the few quantitative studies that use somewhat 
recent data include Calfano & Sahliyeh,20 Howard21 and Miard22. Calfano & Sahliyeh, as well 
as Miard, who specifically examines the effects of mobile phones, find no significant 
relationship between the Internet/mobile connectivity and political activism respectively. 
Offering more recent data on Internet and mobile phone use in Muslim countries from 1994 to
2008, Philip N. Howard comes to a more encouraging result. In addition, Patrick Meier has 
published preliminary results of his ambitious dissertation research of a large-N quantitative 
study on the correlation between the diffusion of ICT and anti-government protests.23 Earl et 
al.24 add to the debate by differentiating between different kinds of Internet activism and its 
relations to collective action; while Aday et al.25 propose a different frame of analysis for the 
impact of social media in political protests. For a comprehensive literature review on this 
research field, compare also Joyce.26
of Online Organizing. The SAIS Review o f International Affairs, 30 (2), 37-49; Hindeman, M. (2008). The 
Myth o f Digital Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Kalathil, S. & Boas T. C. (2003). 
Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact o f the Internet on Authoritarian Rule. Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment For International Peace; Morozov, E. (2011a). The Net Delusion: The Dark Side o f 
Internet Freedom. New York, NY: Public Affairs; Morozov, E. (2011b, Jan. 15). Picking a Fight with Clay 
Shirky. Foreign Policy. Retrieved 10 April 2011 from <http://neteffect.foreignpolicy.com/>; and many 
others by Morozov <http://www.evgenymorozov.com/writings.html>. For an interesting popular 
discussion between Shirky and Morozov, see <http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2009/11/how- 
dictators-watch-us-on-the-web/>.
19 Compare Faris, D. (2010). Revolutions Without Revolutionaries? Social Media Networks and Regime 
Response in Egypt. Publicly Accessible Penn Disseratations. Paper 116. University of Pennsylvania, 2ff; 
and Meier, P. (2009b, Nov. 19). Digital Activism and the Puffy Clouds of Anecdote Heaven. iRevolution 
homepage. Retrieved 15 April 2011 from <http://irevolution.net/2009/11/19/anecdote-heaven/>.
2 0 Calfano, B. R. & Sahliyeh, E. (2008). Transmitting Reform? Assessing New Media Influence on 
Political Rights in the Middle East. Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, 17 (1), 63-77.
2 1  Howard, P. (2010). The Digital Origins o f Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and 
Political Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2 2 Miard, F. (2009). Call for Power? Mobile Phones as Facilitators of Political Activism. Conference Paper 
Presented at the 50th Annual Convention o f the International Studies Association. New York, February 
15-18, 2009.
23 Meier, P. (2009a). The Impact of the Information Revolution on Protest Frequency in Repressive 
Contexts. Conference Paper Presented at the 50th Annual Convention o f the International Studies 
Association. New York, February 15-18, 2009.
2 4  Earl, J., Kimport, K., Prieto, G., Rush, C. & Reynoso K. (2010). Changing the World One Webpage at 
A Time: Conceptualizing and Explaining Internet Activism. Mobilizationg: An International Journal, 15 (4), 
425-446.
2 5  Aday, S., Farrell, H., Lynch, M., Sides, J., Kelly, J. & Zuckerman E. (2010, Sept.). Blogs and Bullets. 
New Media in Contentious Politics. Peaceworks Report. Washington, DC: United States Institute of 
Peace.
2 6  Joyce, M.C. (2011, Jan. 20). Activism, Repression, and ICT: What We Know Now. Meta-activism
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1.2 Term inology
To obviate any ambiguousness, this section serves to clarify the basic terms used 
throughout this study. In the analysis of the impact of Internet-based applications and mobile 
technologies on social and political communication and coordination, there are a variety of 
terms used, leading to a certain ambiguity as to what is actually meant.27 A definition of the 
most significant concepts used in this study seems, therefore, necessary.
Social Media and ICT. Throughout this study, I will hereafter use the term "social 
media” when referring to the applications of information and communication technology (ICT). 
Though the term ICT is itself often applied -  sometimes with the prefix "new” -  when 
analyzing the influence of mobile phone and Internet technology on contentious politics, it is 
rather used to refer to the technological aspects of modern ways of communication and 
information sharing.28 The term "social media” in contrast has the advantage of including the 
software applications of these technologies, as well as the social practices observed with their 
dissemination and use. This paper thus follows the rather broader definition of social media 
proposed by Ahlqvist et al., who specifically refer to social media as both a set of tools and a 
modus operandi, emphasizing the technological aspects as well as the social practices 
observed with them: "Social media refers to the interaction of people and also to creating, 
sharing, exchanging and commenting contents in virtual communities and networks”.29 This 
definition is also sufficiently close to how Shirky loosely understands social media: "text 
messaging, e-mail, photo sharing, social networking, and the like”.30 Since mobile phone 
technologies have been important for the communication and organization of political
Homepage. Retrieved 10 March from <http://www.meta-activism.org/2011/01/activism-repression-and- 
ict-what-we-know-now/>.
2 7  E.g.: “social software” [Shirky, C. (2003, Mar. 9). Social Software and the Politics of Groups. Clay 
Shirky's Writings About the Internet Homepage.]; “mobile communications”, “computing technologies”, 
“devices” [Rheingold, H. (2003). Smart Mobs: The Power o f the Mobile Many. Cambridge, MA : Perseus 
Publications.]; “new media” [Wardrip-Fruin, N. & Montfort, N. (eds) (2003). The New Media Reader. 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.]; “Web 2.0” [O'Reilly, T. (2005). What Is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and 
Business Models for the Next Generation of Software. O'Reilly Homepage.]; “social network sites” [Boyd, 
D. M. & Ellison, N. B. (2007). Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship. Journal o f 
Computer-Mediated Communication, 13 (1), Article 11.]; “computer-mediated communication” [Zimbra, 
D., Abbasi, A., Chen, H. (2010). A Cyber-Archaeology Approach to Social Movement Research: 
Framework and Case Study. Journal o f Computer-Mediated Communication, 16, 48-70.]; “digital 
activism” (www.meta-activism.org).
2 8  European Union (2001, Dec. 14). Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament. Information and Communication Technologies in Development: The Role o f ICTs 
in EC Development Policy. European Commission, C0M(2001) 770; International Telecommunication 
Union (2009). Measuring the Information Society: The ICT Development Index. Geneva.
2 9
Ahlqvist, T., Bäck, A., Halonen M. & Heinonen S. (2008). Social Media Roadmaps: Exploring the 
Futures Triggered by Social Media. VTT Tiedotteita Research Notes 2454. Helsinki: Edita Prima Oy, 13.
30 Shirky, The Political Power o f Social Media, para 7.
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protests,31 they are specifically included in the term "social media” as understood in this
32paper.32
Regime Change. To define "regime change”, we first have to look at the notion of 
"regime” . Calvert provides a basic definition: "a regime is the name usually given to a 
government or sequence of governments in which power remains essentially in the hands of 
the same social group” .33 Defining "regime change”, Stephanie Lawson refers to Stephen D. 
Krasner and his definition of "regime” as "principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actors converge in a given issue area” .34 Lawson specifically points 
out that Krasner's distinction between principles and norms on the one hand, and rules and 
procedures on the other can help with our understanding of "regime change”: "Change within 
a regime involves alterations of rules and decision-making procedures, but not of norms or 
principles; change of regime involves alteration of norms and principle.”35 "Regime change” in 
this study is thus understood as this change in kind, i.e. of norms and principles, or, in other 
words, when the power does not remain "in the hands of the same social group”. The ousting 
of former President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, the continued protests by Egyptians against 
members of the former regime, the dissolution of the former ruling party and the public trials 
of former regime leaders and associates can thus be understood as "regime change”, while 
the reforms proposed to demonstrators by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad are not 
understood as such here.36
31 A famous example is the massive wave of demonstrations against former Philippine President Joseph 
Estrada in January 2001, originally organized through text messaging. See: Rheingold, Smart Mobs; 
Shirky, C. (2011, Jan/Feb.). The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the Public Sphere, and 
Political Change. Foreign Affairs.
32 Unlike Kaplan & Haenlein, for example, who define social media as "a group of Internet-based 
applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the 
creation and exchange of User Generated Content”, thus excluding mobile technologies not necessarily 
linked to the Internet. See: Kaplan, A. & Haenlein, M. (2010). Users of the World, Unite! The Challenges 
and Opportunities of Social Media. Business Horizons, 53 (1), 59-68.
33 Calvert, P. (ed.) (1987). The Process o f Political Succession. London: Macmillan, 18.
3 4  Krasner cited in Lawson, S. (1993). Conceptual Issues in the Comparative Study of Regime Change 
and Democratization. Comparative Politics, 25 (2), 183-205, 185. Lawson acknowledges that "the notion 
of 'regime' in international relations theory is obviously situated in a different context of relationships”, but 
holds that "the formulation of definitions there provides some further insights relevant to the domestic 
arena” which is the basic frame for political uprisings against authoritarian regimes (ibid.).
3 5  Krasner, ibid.
3 6  Compare for Egypt: Al-Masry Al-Youm (2011, Mar. 23). Student Protests Continue across Egypt. Al- 
Masry Al-Youm English Edition. Retrieved 10 May 2011 from
<http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/371028>; Michael, M. (2011, Apr. 8 ). Egypt Army Kills 1 
Dispersing Overnight Protest. Associated Press. Retrieved 10 May 2011 from
<http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=13329347>; Al Jazeera (2011a, Feb. 22). The Arab 
Awakening. Al Jazeera Online. Retrieved 23 February 2011 from
<http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/spotlight/2011/02/2011222121213770475.html>; Al Jazeera (2011b,
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1.3 Theory & M ethodology
The theoretical framework for this paper is based on the theory of information 
cascades, developed by Susanne Lohmann as a model to explain regime change,37 and later 
adopted by Clay Shirky in analyzing social media use and its impact on authoritarian
38regimes.38
1.3.1 Susanne Lohmann: A Sequence o f Protests as Inform ation Cascades
Building on the work of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch who analyze the 
informational dynamics of "fads, fashions, custom, and cultural change”,39 Lohmann applies 
their model of "informational cascade” to the analysis of political change through mass 
political actions.40 In her model, Lohmann examines regimes which can largely control the 
dissemination of public information, i.e. authoritarian regimes.41 Since in these environments, 
individual experiences about the regime occur privately, information about the benign or 
malign nature of the regime is dispersed among the population. "In this situation”, Lohmann 
explains, "there exists an informational role for political action” , as "it is possible that the 
status quo regime is supported by a sufficiently large number of imperfectly informed people, 
although it would collapse if some of the dispersed information were to become publicly
known.”42
Apr. 7). Mubarak's Former Chief of Staff Arrested. Al Jazeera Online. Retrieved 10 May2011 from 
<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/04/20114720540306784.html>; Al Jazeera (2011c, 
Apr. 16). Egypt Dissolves Former Ruling Party. A l Jazeera Online. Retrieved 10 May2011 from 
<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/04/2011416125051889315.html>. For Syria, see: 
Seale, P. (2011, May). Syrien, der Große Irrtum. Le Monde diplomatique (German Edition), May 2011, 7.
37 Lohmann, S. (1993). A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action. The American 
Political Science Review, 87 (2), 319-333; Lohmann, Rationality, Revolution, and Revolt; Lohmann, The 
Dynamics of Informational Cascades.
3 8  Shirky, Here Comes Everybody Shirky, The Net Advantage.
3 9  Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D. & Welch, I. (1992). A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural 
Change as Informational Cascades. Journal o f Political Economy, 100 (5), 992-1026.
4 0  Lohmann, Rationality, Revolution, and Revolt, 8 ff; Lohmann, S. (2000). Collective Action Cascades: An 
Informational Rationale for the Power in Numbers. Journal o f Economic Surveys, 14 (5), 654-684. 
Lohmann also refers to previous work on behavioral cascades distinguishing mechanistic and 
informational cascade models. For mechanistic cascade models, see: Granovetter, M (1978). Threshold 
Models of Collective Behavior. American Journal o f Sociology, 83, 1420-1443; and Kuran, T. (1991).
Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989. World Politics, 44 
(1), 7-48.
41 Although Lohmann explicitly states that her model “can be easily extended to allow for a mix of public 
and private information, thereby making the theory applicable to democracies with a free press and other 
sources of public information” - Lohmann, Rationality, Revolution, and Revolt, FN 23.
4 2  Lohmann, Rationality, Revolution, and Revolt, 10f.
CGP Working Papers 01/2013 9
Florian Fischer Cascades of Collective Action
Following this assumption, Lohmann's model interprets a sequence of protest activities 
as the revelation of this dispersed information about the regime over a period of time, in which 
the public "takes informational cues from changes in the size of the protest” .43 As the cascade 
of political actions is publicly observed, each individual chooses whether to support the 
incumbent regime or not. If the protest activities reveal the regime to be malign, i.e. if a 
sufficiently large number of people decide to express dissatisfaction or disloyalty and join the 
protests on the basis of personal experiences with the regime, the regime loses public 
support and collapses.44 In this way, Lohmann's model accommodates for a non-linear 
development of protest activities, since "[t]he survival of the incumbent regime depends on 
the dynamic path of mass turnout over time.”45
Lohmann then applies her model to the Leipzig Monday demonstrations and the 
subsequent collapse of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) from 1989 to 1990, 
interpreting the
"demonstrations as an informational cascade that publicly revealed some of 
the decentralized information about the malign nature of the East German 
regime and that thereby created pressures for political liberalization and 
reform and eventually led to the collapse of the regime.”46
The model of information cascades as understood by Lohmann can thus be regarded 
as a helpful frame for the analysis of political protest in authoritarian regimes and its 
prospects to succeed in effecting regime change, while emphasizing the process aspect of a 
protest movement.
1.3.2 Clay Shirky: Social Media Improve Inform ation Cascades
In his attempt to theorize the impact of social media on contentious politics, Clay 
Shirky applies Lohmann's model to new media theory.47
4 3  Ibid., 25.
4 4  Ibid., 10.
4 5  Ibid., 4. Compare also Lohmann, A Signaling Model, 328ff. It is worthwhile to mention in this context 
that Lohmann herself does not provide a time frame for this “dynamic path” or an explanation of what “for 
a while” could mean within this model besides her unique case account of the Monday demonstrations in 
Leipzig, examining a period of approx 2.5 years.
4 6  Lohmann, The Dynamics of Informational Cascades, 91.
4 7 Shirky, Here Comes Everybody  Shirky, The Net Advantage; Shirky, The Political Power of Social 
Media.
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In Here Comes Everybody, Shirky argues that new information and communication 
technology, while increasing the access to and diffusion of information, critically reduces the 
costs of aggregating information, thus changing our way of communicating and coordinating 
action.48 For him, "the spread of information and its value as a coordinating force increased 
dramatically”49 with the development of technology that removes "two old obstacles— locality 
of information, and barriers of group action”.50
As the availability and distribution of information in the public sphere is a significant 
factor in the theory of information cascades, Shirky specifically refers to Lohmann when 
arguing that "social media improves [sic] political information cascades”.51 To support his 
argument, Shirky introduces the military concept of "shared awareness” as "the ability of 
many different people and groups to understand a situation, and to understand who else has 
the same understanding” .52 As "easier and wider dissemination of information changes [this] 
group awareness”, social media positively affect information cascades in their success to lead 
to regime change by enhancing access to and dissemination of information.53 Shirky 
specifically takes Lohmann's example of the Leipzig Monday demonstrations of 1989 as an 
illustration:
Every week the march happened without a crackdown offered additional 
evidence that the marches provided an outlet for their disaffection; each 
successful march diminished the fear felt by some additional part of the 
populace. Finally people in Leipzig could see others acting on the 
knowledge that the GDR was rotten—"everyone knows that everyone knows
4 8  Shirky, Here Comes Everybody, 148ff. To this regard, Lynch agrees that “[a]t the micro-level, mobile 
phones and text messaging have played an important role in changing communication patterns and 
dissemination of information” - Lynch, M. (2006). Voices o f the New Arab Public: Iraq, A l Jazeera, and 
Middle East Politics Today. New York: Columbia University Press, 50.
4 9  Shirky, Here Comes Everybody, 159.
5 0  Ibid., 153. There is a broad discussion on how blogs changed the locality of information and 
communication, thus adding to certain types of group action: Al-Roomi, S. (2007). Women, Blogs, and 
Political Power in Kuwait. in Seib, P. (ed.) (2007). New Media and the New Middle East. New York, NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 139-155; Seib, P. (2008). The A l Jazeera Effect: How the New Global Media Are 
Reshaping World Politics. Washington, D.C: Potomac Books, Inc., 160 & 181ff. It is worthwhile to 
mention here that for Shirky social media do not “create collective action - they merely remove the 
obstacles to it” - Shirky, Here Comes Everybody, 159.
51 Shirky, The Net Advantage, para 5.
52 Shirky, Here Comes Everybody, 163.
53 Ibid., 151. Lee argues in this context that “[i]n terms of mobilizing structures, the Internet can promote 
and enrich supporters' participation by 'faster' delivery of 'more' information in 'cheaper' ways” - Lee, J. 
(2009). Net Power in Action: Internet Activism in the Contentious Politics of South Korea. Dissertation 
Submitted to the Graduate School-New Brunswick. New Brunswick: Rutgers, The State University of 
New Jersey, 57. Lee refers hereby to the works of Garrett, R. K. (2006). Protest in an Information 
Society. A Review of Literature on Social Movements and New ICTs. Information, Communication & 
Society, 9 (2), 202-224, and Smith, J. (2000). Globalization Resistance: The Battle of Seattle and the 
Future of Social Movements. Mobilization, 6  (1), 1-19.
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that everyone knows”. This shared awareness is the step necessary for real 
public action.54
It is within this model that Shirky argues for a positive account of the Iranian Green 
Movement of 2009: "the insurgency has nevertheless achieved the transition from distributed 
but uncoordinated discontent to being an actual protest movement, and part of that transition 
was achieved with these tools [social media, my note]” (my accentuation), stating that 
"[c]learly, the protests following the 12th June elections were aided by social media.” Shirky 
further explains his understanding of the nexus between information cascades and social 
media with regard to the shutdown of communication technology: "In the Iranian case, once 
the information about general discontent had successfully cascaded, the coordination among 
the populace remained intact, even when the tools which helped disseminate that information 
were shut down”. For Shirky, the continuation of protests despite a crackdown on social 
media access does not infringe the point made, as social media helped coordinating and 
spreading the information about the protest in the first place. Once set in motion, the 
information cascade does not necessarily depend on social media anymore.
Shirky's embedding of social media into the model of information cascades thus aims 
at adapting the model to our present time, and will possibly enhance our understanding of 
how social media may contribute to the formation and development of public protests.55 With 
Shirky, we might thus expect that by reducing the cost of information distribution and 
communication, social media tools might positively affect information cascades as understood 
by Lohmann.
1.3.3 Summary o f the Research Design: Lohmann & Shirky Read Together
While in Lohmann's model, regime change is the possible outcome of public protests 
understood as an information cascade that reveals, aggregates and diffuses information 
dismissive of the incumbent regime, Shirky adds that social media improve information 
cascades by reducing the costs of revealing and aggregating information while increasing the 
access to and diffusion of this information. With regard to the prospect of public protests to
5 4  Shirky, Here Comes Everybody, 162f. Compare Seib for the role of information dissemination in the 
context of political change: "[w]hen a critical mass has better access to information, political processes 
are more likely to change” - Seib, P. (ed.) (2007). New Media and the New Middle East. New York, NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 9. Later, Seib talks about "a critical mass of awareness” that can enable "a political 
tipping point” - Seib, The A l Jazeera Effect, 179.
55 Shirky also agrees with Lohmann in her approach to regard a larger protest history when analyzing 
regime change: "both the empirical and the theoretical work suggest that protests, when effective, are at 
the end of a long process, rather than a replacement for it” - Shirky, The Net Advantage, para 26.
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succeed in effecting regime change, the model of information cascades is thus applied with 
two distinct aspects: the sequencing o f protests before regime change is effected and the role 
o f social media in enhancing the information cascade.
In order to test my first hypothesis concerning the sequencing of protests before 
regime change is effected, I run a simple media research with the full text information service 
LexisNexis, counting any manifested protest held against the respective regime that was 
mentioned in press agency reports between January 2009 and January 2011 (Chapter 2). 
Testing my second hypothesis concerning the role of social media in enhancing information 
cascades, I use an adjusted Digital Access Index (aDAI) to measure the ability of individuals 
in both countries to access and use social media and ICTs (Chapter 3). The aDAI is inspired 
by Digital Access Index which was established by the Market Information and Statistics Unit 
of the International Telecommunications Union in 2003, focusing on landline and mobile 
phone subscriptions, Internet access prices, adult literacy, Internet bandwidth and overall 
Internet usage. The modified aDAI enables the consideration of social media use as an 
additional factor by combining the indicator of Facebook use and the indicator of the diffusion 
of blogs in each country respectively. In addition, I gathered updated data for the compilation 
of the aDAI, as the data used for the DAI is highly outdated. Before testing for the two aspects 
of the model respectively in Chapters 2 and 3, an explanation is given below on the choice of 
cases of this study.
1.4 Choice o f Cases
Within the frame of a comparative case study, this paper follows a "most similar 
design” approach with the choice of Egypt and Syria as the two case countries to compare. In 
this way, a number of background variables can be controlled for as both countries share a 
number of similar features, specifically with regard to (i) the political system, (ii) the state- 
security apparatus and the degree of (digital) censorship, as well as (iii) the level of economic 
development.
Egypt and Syria share a similar and partly common history.56 (i) Since independence 
from European colonial rule, and after a certain period of political instability ended by a coup 
d'état, both countries have been consistently ruled by a succession of autocratic leaders, and 
have been authoritarian regimes since independence throughout the 20th century.
56 Information in this section is taken from the Britannica Online Encyclopedia country description for 
Syria and Egypt, if not otherwise stated.
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Authoritarian rule in both countries was centered on a military hierarchy, and tightened by an 
emergency law giving unrestricted power to the ruling elite. The emergency laws in force in 
Syria (since 1963) and Egypt (since 1981) also allow both states to build a wide-ranging state 
security network and to intensely suppress dissidents, including imposing heavy crackdowns 
on the Islamist opposition.57 In its annual analyses from 2002 to 2010, the Freedom House 
Index, measuring the political rights and civil liberties on a worldwide country-to-country basis, 
categorized both Egypt and Syria consistently as "not free”—the lowest of the three groups on 
the index.58
(ii) Particularly, the elaborated state security apparatus plays an important part in 
suppressing basic political and civil liberties in both countries, famous as they are/were for 
arbitrary imprisonment and torturing of suspected dissidents.59 Concerning censorship of the 
media, including the Internet, both countries adopted multiple mechanisms to suppress 
opposing views. Egypt and Syria are ranked 127th and 173rd respectively out of 178 
countries on the Reporters Without Borders' Press Freedom Index.60 With regard to 
suppressing opposing views on the Internet, both countries monitor and restrict Internet use, 
harassing and arresting those expressing dissent.61 Syria, in addition, filters Internet content, 
and has been blocking major social media sites such as Facebook and YouTube until 
recently.62
5 7 The "Hama Massacre” of 1982 by the Syrian army to quell an Islamist revolt is one of "the single 
deadliest acts by any Arab government against its own people in the modern Middle East”, see: Wright,
R. (2008). Dreams and Shadows: the Future o f the Middle East. New York, NY: Penguin. Thousands of 
suspected Islamist militants were jailed in the 1990s in Egypt 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2009>.
5 8  Freedom House (2011, Jan.). Freedom in the World 2011. The Authoritarian Challenge to Democracy. 
Freedom House Report.
5 9  Human Rights Watch (2010, Jul.). A Wasted Decade. Human Rights in Syria during Bashar al-Asad’s 
First Ten Years in Power. © 2010 Human Rights Watch; Human Rights Watch (2011, Jan.). Work on Him 
Until He Confesses. Impunity for Torture in Egypt. ©  2011 Human Rights Watch.
6 0  Reporters Without Borders (2010). 2010 World Press Freedom Index. Paris. For a detailed description 
of Internet censorship and the oppression of dissent in both countries see: Abdulla, R. A. (2007). The 
Internet in the Arab World: Egypt and beyond. New York: Peter Lang.
61 Open Net Initiative (2009a, Aug. 6 ). Internet Filtering in Egypt. Country Profile Report; Open Net 
Initiative (2009b, Aug. 7). Internet Filtering in Syria. Country Profile Report. Both countries are on the 
"List of the 13 Internet enemies” produced by Reporters Without Borders <http://en.rsf.org/list-of-the-13- 
internet-enemies-07-11-2006,19603.html>. Compare also the International Freedom of Expression 
Exchange country profiles for Egypt and Syria <http://www.ifex.org>, and the Threatened Voices Project 
<http://threatened.globalvoicesonline.org/>, as well as El Gody, A. (2007). New Media, New Audience, 
New Topics, and New Forms of Censorship in the Middle East, in: Seib, P. (ed.). New Media and the 
New Middle East, 213-234.
6 2 Al-Shagra, A.F. (2011, Feb. 8 ). Facebook and YouTube Unblocked in Syria Today [Updated]. The Next 
Web. Retrieved 20 April 2011 from: <http://thenextweb.com/me/2011/02/08/facebook-and-youtube-to-be- 
unblocked-in-syria-today/>.
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(iii) Despite pledges for political and economic reform, both Hosni Mubarak (President 
of Egypt from 1981 to 2011) and Bashar al-Assad (President of Syria succeeding his father 
since 2000 until today) never had it implemented. The Human Development Index lists both 
countries throughout the last two decades as among the countries with "Medium Human 
Development”.63 In the beginning of 2011 and after the ousting of former Tunisian President 
Ben Ali, public protests developed in both Egypt and Syria. While the ones in Egypt quickly 
gained momentum and finally lead to the fall of Mubarak's regime, those in Syria developed 
slowly in comparison, and at the time of writing (May 2011) did not result in major political 
changes in Syria.64 As stated before (Section 1.2), and with regard to the dependent variable 
proposed in this study, we have observed regime change in Egypt but not in Syria so far. To 
state the obvious, yet for this research still important: both cases seem ideal for this study, as 
the uprisings in both Syria and Egypt clearly demand(ed) a change of regime as understood 
here.
6 3  United Nations (2010). Human Development Report 2010. United Nations Development Program. 
Retrieved 1 April 2011 from <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/>. Developed by the UN, the Human 
Development Index measures indicators of health, education and living standards. See specifically Table 
2 of the 2010 report: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Table2_reprint.pdf>.
6 4  Al Jazeera, The Arab Awakening.
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2. Independent Variable 1: Number of Manifested Protests
2.1 In troduction
In line with Lohmann's model of information cascades, the process of protest 
development over time is crucial to understanding regime change through information 
cascades. The underlying hypothesis is: the more political protests manifested before a given 
moment, the more probable the success o f subsequent political protest to effect regime 
change. The first independent variable (IV-1) examined in this paper is thus the number o f 
manifested protests held against the regime in the last two years o f each country. This 
variable serves to include previous manifestation of protests in Egypt and Syria, 
contextualizing the recent uprisings in a broader protest history.
2.2 Operationalization
To operationalize this independent variable, I count all manifested protests held 
against the regime that was mentioned in press agency reports between January 2009 and 
January 2011. “Manifested protest” refers to any protest taken to the street, and "held against 
the regime” refers to any slogan, sign or symbol used during the protest that indicates a clear 
criticism of the political system and/or clear demands for the change of that very system 
present at the time of the protest. I thus exclude national and local sectarian protests. 
Protests on regional and/or international events or actors that occurred during the period of 
observation are not of interest here either.65
To simplify the search considering the scope of this study, I run a simple media 
research with the full text information service LexisNexis.66 To focus only on relevant results, I 
set the input search parameter “sources” to “press -  all languages” , and parameter “date” to 
“from 1. January 2009 to 1. January 2011”, and use search terms “protest in Egypt” and 
“protest in Syria” respectively. I control the results using the same search parameters with the
65 Those are, for example, protests against Israel or the United States, e.g. in the case of the June 2010 
Gaza-Flotilla.
6 6 LexisNexis is a commercial provider of professional databases of economic, finance and legal 
information, as well as of full text international press databases <http://e-
solution.lexisnexis.de/KSH/de/index.html>. For discussion, compare also: Stock, M. & Stock W. (2005). 
LexisNexis Recht und LexisNexis Wirtschaft: Informationsquelle für den deutschen Markt. Password, 4, 
24-31.
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search terms "demonstration in Egypt” and "demonstration in Syria” respectively. To limit the 
results, I regard only outputs in the category "news agency- and press reports” . Given the 
operationalization parameters, I analyze the search output, counting only those indicating a 
clear criticism of the political system and/or clear demands for the change of that very system. 
The time frame "1. January 2009 to 1. January 2011” is congruent with Lohmann's application 
of the model (compare FN 45) and seems appropriate here, as it is long enough to analyze 
the development of a recent protest history while excluding any protests that could be 
interpreted as a direct reaction to the political uprisings in Tunisia in early 2011.
2.3 Results & D iscussion
The result shows a significant difference between the two countries observed (for a 
detailed list of the events falling under the given search parameters, see Annex 1):
Country Egypt Syria
Number of manifested protests against 6 0the regime
Note: Time frame is 1 January 2009 to 1 January 2011.
Over the course of two years preceding the early 2011 uprisings in Syria and Egypt -  
and given the aforementioned search parameters -  there were a total of six manifested 
protests mentioned in international news reports on Egypt. There was no protest in Syria 
mentioned using the same search parameters during the same period. Considering the 
situation of both countries at the time of writing with regard to the value of the dependent 
variable, this result supports the first hypothesis that the preceding protest history of a country 
can be a correlating factor of the success of ongoing protests in effecting regime change, and 
this correlation is positive in nature. It can be said that a sequence of protests prior to a given 
protest may have a positive correlation with the latter's success in effecting regime change. 
This outcome is thus in accordance with Lohmann's model of information cascades, 
highlighting the relevance of accounting for a protest history.
For further research, it would be interesting and worthwhile to examine each country in 
greater detail.67 Just a detailed glimpse reveals a clear difference between the protest history 
in the two cases. In Egypt, a strong opposition movement was formed during the 2005 
presidential election and "opposed a fifth term for President Mubarak or the succession of his
6 7  For the case of Egypt, compare: Faris, Revolutions Without Revolutionaries?
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son Gamal, seeking genuine democratic reforms in Egypt” .68 Started as a blogring (a loose 
association of blogs) termed Kefaya (Egyptian Arabic for "Enough!”), it "organized tens of 
thousands of citizen protests on several occasions using the Internet for their cause”.69 In 
interplay with a growing labor protest movement that included tens of thousands of workers 
going on strike and demonstrating for higher wages on numerous occasions between 2006 
and 2008,70 this strong, albeit diverse and loosely connected oppositions inspired the so- 
called "April 6 Movement” . This movement staged, in reference to the massive and violently 
suppressed labor protests of April 6, 2008, a wave of protests on the "Day of Anger”, April 6,
2009, that were "initially organized by an Internet-based activist group (...) using Facebook to 
spread word of the action”.71 In Syria, we miss this kind of modern protest history. The last 
major uprising in Syria ended in the so-called "Hama Massacre” of 1982 (compare FN 57). In 
the case of Egypt, it is obvious to claim that these experiences informed the protests listed in 
Annex 1 that were held during the years of 2009 and 2010, preceding the so-named Egyptian 
Revolution in 2011. And it is equally obvious to claim that this protest history, either viewed 
from a 2-year or from a 5-year perspective,72 had an effect on the Egyptian society and on 
how this society perceived itself vis-à-vis the authoritarian regime it was ruled by, or, speaking 
with Lohmann's model: these previous protests revealed the information of widespread 
disagreement with the regime.
2.4 L im ita tions
Despite these results, we cannot claim that this sequence of previous protests 
probably, much less necessarily, lead to a regime change. The scope of this study is way to 
small to make such bold claims. We can neither allow any generalizations with regard to other 
cases despite the obvious correlation in the examined ones (6 protests in Egypt, 0 in Syria). 
The result from a large-N research study might indeed be very different from this one. It would 
also be interesting to compare if the uprisings in Tunisia early 2011 that eventually led to
6 8 Seib, New Media and the New Middle East, 221.
6 9 Ibid.
7 0  There were, according to media, "more than 200 labor protests in Egypt during 2006”. See: Targeted 
News Service (2007, Apr. 27). Egyptian Government Should Reverse Its Order to Close CTUWS Offices. 
Targeted News Service. Compare also: Morrow, A. & Al-Omrani, K. M. (2007, May 15). Spate of Strikes 
and Protests in Egypt; EGYPT: Labour Unrest Spreads. IPS -  Inter Press Service (Latin America); and 
Bel Aiba, I. (2008, Apr. 8 ). Egypt Scrambles to Appease Workers after Deadly Riots. Agence France 
Presse -  English.
71 Morrow & Al-Omrani, Spate of Strikes and Protests in Egypt. See also: Radsch, C. (2008, Sept.). Core 
to Commonplace: The Evolution of Egypt’s Blogosphere. Arab Media & Society, 6 .
7 2
The outcome of this research does not change significantly when the time-period observed is extended 
from 2 to 6  years. Between 2005 and 2010, Egypt is coded with 17 protests, while Syria still counts none 
(see Annex 2).
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regime change were preceded by a sequence of protests or not; and if yes, how the situation 
had developed. Besides, the hypothesis on information cascades and regime change is only 
supported by ex-post scenarios, in which regime change already occurred, and does not 
provide a prospect of just how long a protest history needs to be to have a positive impact on 
regime change.
In this regard, we have to acknowledge that this research design does not allow for a 
quantifiable value of it. The hypothesis that the more political protest was manifested before a 
given moment, the more probable the success o f subsequent political protests to effect 
regime change is actually not affirmed by the result of this two-country comparison, as the 
number of protest in Syria is zero. It may well be that the number of protests preceding a 
given protest is not correlative with the latter's success in effecting regime change, but rather 
the overall occurrence of a foregoing protest history is. Another difficulty lies in the 
operationalization adopted in this study. Due to the research scope, I only regarded press 
agency articles listed in LexisNexis containing the exact phrase “protest in Egypt (or Syria)” 
and “demonstration in Egypt (or Syria)” , disregarding those that may have dealt with protests 
during the same period but did not include this specific phrase. A search with “protest” and 
“Egypt” as single yet added (“AND”) operators would have included several thousand outputs. 
Adding to this is the fact that news agencies might not be a totally reliable source when 
wanting to include a complete history of protests: “ If it’s not in the news does not mean it’s not 
happening”, as Meier criticized correctly.73 When controlling for a five-year period (see FN 
72), the massive April 6, 2008 labor protests in Egypt74 were not included in the results, for 
example.
Despite the shortcomings, this outcome nevertheless hints at the importance of 
analyzing protest history when looking at factors relating a protest to its success in effecting 
regime change.
73 Meier, P. (2010, Jan. 7). Where I Disagree with Morozov vs Shirky on Digital Activism. iRevolution 
Homepage. Retrieved 26 April 2011 from <http://irevolution.net/2010/01/07/morozov-vs-shirky/>. Meier 
points out that news agencies are not a reliable source when it comes to completeness of protest 
coverage, comparing, in the case of Pakistan, local Field Monitors of Swisspeace who counted 54 
individual protests during 2007 while Reuters covered only 7 of these in the same period.
7 4  Bel Aiba, Egypt Scrambles to Appease Workers after Deadly Riots.
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3. Independent Variable 2: Social Media Use
3.1 In troduction
I now turn to the possible influence of social media in information cascades leading to 
regime change. In line with Shirky, we would expect that social media improve information 
cascades. The hypothesis formulated is thus: the more social media tools are used in a given 
regime, the more successful political protests can be in effecting regime change. To test this 
hypothesis, we will have to measure the use of social media in both cases. Therefore, the 
second independent variable (IV-2) examined in this paper is the degree o f social media use 
in the two countries observed.
3.2 Operationalization
It is difficult to operationalize the degree of social media use. The Digital Access Index 
(DAI) established by the Market Information and Statistics Unit of the International 
Telecommunications Union serves as an informative reference. As a global index measuring 
"the overall ability of individuals in a country to access and use new ICTs” in a unified 
approach, it provides a sufficient approximation of the use of social media.75 The DAI consists 
of eight variables with an impact on social media use and access. These variables are 
compiled into five categories: fixed telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants and mobile 
cellular subscribers per 100 inhabitants (measuring infrastructure); Internet access price as 
percentage of per capita GNI(measuring affordability); adult literacy and combined primary, 
secondary and tertiary school enrollment level (measuring knowledge); per capita 
international Internet bandwidth (bits) and broadband subscribers per 100 inhabitants 
(measuring quality); and Internet users per 100 inhabitants (measuring Internet use).76
As the DAI includes the percentage of mobile cellular subscribers and Internet users in 
a country's population, it includes two of the basic categories of interest of the second 
independent variable. Furthermore, by measuring Internet bandwidth, it accounts for the
75 International Telecommunication Union (2010a). Digital Access Index (DAI). International 
Telecommunication Union Homepage. Retrieved 26 April from <http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/dai/>.
7 6  International Telecommunication Union (2003, Nov. 19). ITU Digital Access Index: World’s First Global 
ICT Ranking Education and Affordability Key to Boosting New Technology Adoption. International 
Telecommunication Union Press Release. Geneva.
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quality of ICTs in a given country, which is an important indicator with regard to the uploading 
and use of images and videos in social media platforms such as Facebook or YouTube.
Unfortunately, so far the DAI has only been compiled once with data from 2003 and 
earlier. As examining ICTs and social media means examining a field where rapid 
development is prevalent -  especially in areas with previously low access and use of social 
media like the Middle East and North Africa -  the DAI of 2003 can therefore not serve as the 
basis of this study. I therefore compiled a proper index on the basis of the DAI categories, 
henceforth called the adjusted Digital Access Index, or aDAI. In this proper index, I made two 
adjustments to the original DAI: (1) excluding the category “affordability” and (2) including the 
category “social media networks”.
(1) The category “affordability” is disregarded as there was no up-to-date data on 
Internet access prices available for the two cases observed. Disregarding the prices of 
Internet in the overall comparison of Egypt and Syria does not significantly change the 
outcome of this comparison since Internet users mostly connect through Internet cafés where 
prices are generally stable (and equally cheap) in both countries. (2) Introducing the new 
category “social media networks” reflects our definition of social media of referring not only to 
information and communication technologies but also to their software applications. 
Therefore, this new category, combining the indicator “Facebook use” and the indicator 
“diffusion of blogs”, approximates to the use of social media networks. The indicator 
“Facebook use” is aggregated through the variables “Facebook penetration per 100 
inhabitants” and “Facebook penetration per 100 Internet users” , while the indicator “diffusion 
of blogs” is based on the variable “estimated number of bloggers” in each country.
The compilation of aDAI follows the calculation structure of the original DAI. Each 
variable introduced is thus converted to an indicator with a value between 0 and 1 by dividing 
it by the maximum value or “goalpost” . The maximum value or “goalpost” here is taken from 
the original DAI. In the case of the new variables introduced, the maximum value or “goalpost” 
is based on the maximum value reached for each variable worldwide at the time of writing. 
For the variable “Facebook penetration per 100 inhabitants” , the goalpost is 60 (Facebook 
penetration rate in the US77), while the goalpost for “Estimated number of bloggers per 100 
inhabitants” is 11 (equivalent to the percentage of bloggers in inhabitants in the US78). For the
7 7 eMarketer (2011, Feb. 24). Facebook Reaches Majority of US Web Users. eMarketer Press Release. 
Retrieved 29 April 2011 from <http://www.emarketer.com/PressRelease.aspx?R=1008250>.
7 8  Calculated from the data of estimated bloggers in the US for 2012 and the projected population size in
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variable "Facebook penetration per 100 Internet users” , the "natural goalpost” is 100.79 Each 
indicator is then weighted within its category. The weighing values are equally borrowed from 
the original DAI. In the case of the new category "social media networks” both indicators 
introduced are weighted equally (0.5). The resulting category index values are finally 
averaged to obtain the overall aDAI value (compare ITU 2003).
CATEGORY VIARIABLE GOALPOST WEIGHT IN CATEGORY
INFRASTRUCTURE Fixed telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants 60 1 / 2Mobile cellular subscribers per 100 inhabitants 1 0 0 1 / 2
KNOWLEDGE Adult literacy 1 0 0 2/3School enrollment 1 0 0 1/3
QUALITY Internet bandwidth (bits) per capita 1 0 , 0 0 0 1 / 2Broadband subscribers per 100 inhabitants 30 1 / 2
INTERNET USE Internet users per 100 inhabitants 85 1
SOCIAL MEDIA 
USE
Facebook penetration per 100 inhabitants 60 1/4
Facebook penetration per 100 inhabitants 1 0 0 1/4
Estimated number of bloggers per 100 inhabitants 1 1 1 / 2
For the acquisition of data, the following serve, with few exceptions, as main sources: 
Arab Social Media Report,80 the International Telecommunication Union database,81 the 
World Factbook of the US Central Intelligence Agency,82 and United Nations reports.83
the US for 2012 - see: Verna, P. (2008, May). The Blogosphere: A Mass Movement from Grass Roots. 
eMarketer. Retrieved 28 April 2011 from:
<http://www.emarketer.com/Report.aspx?code=emarketer_2000494&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1>
; and United Nations (2008, Apr. 28). World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision. Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, Population Division.
7 9  Though we cannot assume that all Internet users will have a Facebook account, some countries in the 
Arab world have a Facebook penetration rate higher than 100 per 100 Internet users as there are people 
having more than one Facebook account or logging in via different IP addresses, e.g. using their mobile 
phone. Iraq and Djibouti have a penetration rate of 119.07 and 174.58 respectively. See: Mourtada, R. & 
Salem, F. (2011). Facebook Usage: Factors and Analysis. Arab Social Media Report, 1 (1). Dubai School 
of Government's Governance and Innovation Program.
8 0  Ibid.
81 International Telecommunication Union (2010b). ICT Statistics Database. International 
Telecommunication Union Homepage. Retrieved 26 April from <http://www.itu.int/ITU- 
D/ICTEYE/Indicators/Indicators .aspx>.
8 2 Central Intelligence Agency (2011). The World Factbook. Retrieved 21 April 2011 from 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>.
8 3  United Nations (2009a). Human Development Report 2009. United Nations Development Program. 
Retrieved 1 April 2011 from <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/90.html>. Arab Statistics. United 
Nations Development Program, Programme on Governance in the Arab Region (POGAR).
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3.3 Results & D iscussion
The aDAI index values for each of the two cases observed are as follows (for a 
detailed presentation of the results and calculation of the aDAI, including the exact source for 
each variable measured, see Annex 3):
INFRASTRUC­
TURE
KNOWLEDG
E QUALITY
INTERNET
USE
SOCIAL 
MEDIA USE
aDAI
Egypt 0.44 0.73 0.40 0.29 0.08 0.39
Syria 0.38 0.75 0.34 0.24 0 . 0 2 0.35
The difference in the aDAI value for both countries is visible, albeit not significant. The 
aDAI value for Egypt is 0.39, while that for Syria is 0.35. Both countries seem to have 
established a similar digital infrastructure of telephone lines, mobile phones and Internet. 
Although the values in each category— except "knowledge”— are higher for Egypt than for 
Syria, the difference in value points is marginal, as it does not exceed 0.06 for any of the 
categories. It is difficult to draw any significant conclusion from this result on the relevance of 
social media in the development of information cascades specifically, much less with regard 
to regime change in general. In line with our hypothesis, we would have expected a much 
higher aDAI value for Egypt than Syria, as political protests in the former led to regime 
changes, while in the latter they failed to do so at the time of writing. Within the research 
design established in this paper, the hypothesis that the more social media tools are used in a 
given regime, the more successful political protest can be in effecting regime change is thus 
not strongly supported by our results. In addition, the category "social media networks” does 
not change the outcome of the comparison between the two countries, nor does it weigh 
much in each country's calculation of the aDAI. This is due to the structure of the index as 
such. As I tried to stay true to the nature of the original DAI as a global index, I set the so- 
called "goalposts” that convert one variable into an indicator to the highest levels shown 
worldwide as the possible maximum value observed today -  a value both countries are still 
far from approaching.
Yet again, a separate research confined to a more detailed analysis on social media 
use between the countries may come to a different conclusion, and would, in any case, be 
worthwhile. If the category "social media networks” is compared between the two countries 
independently from the aDAI, for example, interesting differences can be observed. In 
general, the use of social media platforms is much more developed, and more significant in
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terms of content in Egypt than in Syria. This is mainly due to Syria having officially allowed 
platforms such as Facebook and YouTube only at the beginning of 2011 and only as a 
response to the public protests unfolding in the region. Before, these platforms had been 
banned since 2007, although Syrian Internet users could and in part did access them through 
proxy servers.84 This explains the relatively low number of 250,000 Facebook users in Syria.85 
In comparison, Egypt has, with its 5 million Facebook users, the largest Facebook community 
in the region (22% of all Facebook users in the Middle East and North Africa), growing at 
more than 100% per year.86 Egypt also has a much more established and lively blogosphere, 
not only when compared to Syria, but also in an overall comparison within the region. With an 
estimated 16,000 blogs,87 it is known for its impressive history of political blogging and blog- 
related-activism.88 Meanwhile, the Syrian blogosphere is much less developed as there are 
only about 600 blogs in Syria in total.89 Still, when comparing blogs per capita -  1.2% for 
Egypt vs. 0.3% for Syria -  the difference is less intriguing, while low on a global scale (there 
are approximately 34.7 million blogs in the US90). When examined in greater detail, one might 
thus come to a different conclusion on the difference in social media use between both 
countries. A qualitative study could therefore also be informative for the possible relevance 
between social media and information cascades.91
3.4 L im ita tions
That the aforementioned difference in social media use between Egypt and Syria is 
not covered by quantitative analysis can be viewed as one limitation of this research. In
8 4 Syria Today (2011, March). Government Loosens Internet Restrictions. Syria Today Online.
8 5  Mourtada & Salem, Facebook Usage: Factors and Analysis.
8 6  Malin, C. (2010, May 24). Middle East & North Africa Facebook Demographics. Dubai: Spot On Public 
Relations.
8 7 Open Net Initiative, Internet Filtering in Egypt.
8 8  Al Malky, R. (2007). Blogging for Reform: The Case of Egypt. Arab Media & Society, 1; Etling, B. et al. 
(2009). Mapping the Arabic Blogosphere: Politics, Culture, and Dissent. Berkman Center Research 
Publication, No. 2009-06. Internet & Democracy Project at The Berkman Center for Internet & Society, 
Harvard University; Faris, Revolutions Without Revolutionaries?; Lynch, M. (2007, Feb.). Blogging the 
New Arab Public. Arab Media & Society, 1; Radsch, Core to Commonplace.
8 9 An estimation of Syrian blogs is difficult to find on the web, let alone an accurate count. I therefore 
contacted Syrian bloggers themselves who are part of Syrian blogrings, asking for their approximation 
(see Annex 3, “Sources”). The number of 600 is also astonishingly close to the number of blogs 
registered on two popular Syrian blogrings in March 2011 (<http://syplanet.com> and 
<http://www.almudawen.net/en/>).
9 0 Verna, The Blogosphere.
91 For an interesting detailed analysis of the April 6  Movement, compare Faris, Revolutions Without 
Revolutionaries? He specifically analyzes the related protests staged in Egypt in 2008 and 2009 as an 
information cascade.
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addition, the use of social media assessed with the aDAI is only an indication of access to 
and degree o f use of the former. It does not measure the content that users access or 
spread.92 Although this is "an almost impossible task given the relative independence of 
Internet users to choose content” , we have to acknowledge that a content-sensitive analysis 
of social media use is necessary (and, in part, possible)93 when approaching the impact that 
social media may have on information cascades and regime change or even simply on 
political activism. In the information cascades model, content has its place as it is important to 
analyze what information signals are given, i.e. what kind of information is spread. Most 
quantitative approaches lack this detailed perspective.94
Another problem encountered here lies in the data itself. As it is enormously difficult to 
get reliable data on social media access and use for research on the scope of this paper— 
much more so for digitally developing countries such as Syria and Egypt—the data used in 
this study is collected from a diverse set of sources, limiting any hope for a unified approach 
while unfortunately disregarding the variety in methodological approaches used. This difficulty 
of access to reliable data also explains, in part, the choice of taking social media platforms 
into consideration here. Other famous platforms such as Twitter and YouTube were 
disregarded, as it was almost impossible to get any data for those, especially in the case of 
Syria. Yet, considering the various publications on social media use in the Middle East, 
Facebook and blogging seem to be by far the most important tools in the social media 
landscape of the region, at least for now.95
9 2 Klotz refers to the difference between ability/access to use and actual use of the Internet. See: Klotz, 
R. J. (2004). The Politics o f Internet Communication. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 19­
2 0 .
93 Calfano & Sahliyeh, Transmitting Reform?, 67. Compare also: Etling et al., Mapping the Arabic 
Blogosphere; Herring, S.C. et al. (2004a, Jan.). Bridging the Gap: A Genre Analysis of Weblogs. 
Proceedings o f the 37th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS'04) - Track 4, 
p.40101.2, January 05-08, 2004; Herring, S. (2004b). Content analysis for new media: Rethinking the 
paradigm. New Research for New Media: Innovative Research Methodologies Symposium Working 
Papers and Readings, 47-66. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota School of Journalism and Mass 
Communication.
9 4  The same is true for mobile phone services, obviously. The index used does not reflect how often and 
especially for what mobile phone and SMS-services are used, nor how prices vary across the region. 
Compare <http://www.arabadvisors.com/Pressers/presser-221110.htm>.
95 Compare, for example: Al Malky, Blogging for Reform; Etling et al., Political Change in the Digital Age; 
Lynch, Blogging the New Arab Public; Murphy, C. (2009, Nov.). Arab Facebook. Al Majalla. Retrieved 2 
April 2011 from: <http://www.majalla.com/en/cover_story/article10699.ece?service=print>; Radsch, Core 
to Commonplace.
CGP Working Papers 01/2013 25
Florian Fischer Cascades of Collective Action
Conclusion
The aim of this study was to contribute to our understanding of the possible impact of 
social media on the success of political protests in effecting regime change. As the model of 
information cascades previously served to explain regime changes (Lohmann), and was 
adapted to new media theory by Clay Shirky, it was chosen as the theoretical blueprint to be 
applied to and tested for in the comparison of the recent public uprisings in Egypt and Syria. 
After two aspects of the model that are supposed to increase the prospects of an uprising to 
effect regime change -  the number of protests before the uprising (Lohmann) and the degree 
of social media use (Shirky) -  were derived and elaborated upon, two hypotheses were 
formulated and tested accordingly. To this end, Egypt served as a case for regime change, 
while Syria was not considered as such.
The findings of this study, limited as they may be, suggest that the number of protests 
before an uprising, i.e. the protest history, has a greater relevance for the success of an 
uprising to effect regime change than the degree of social media use.
Within the research design proposed and the two cases chosen, there was a strong 
positive correlation between the independent variable "number of previous protests” (IV-1) 
and the dependent variable "effected regime change”. This outcome thus supports our first 
hypothesis that the preceding protest history of a country can be a correlating factor with 
regard to the success of ongoing protests in effecting regime change, and this correlation is 
positive in its nature, i.e. that the more political protest was manifested before a given 
moment, the more probable the success o f subsequent political protests to effect regime 
change is. With regard to our cases chosen, it thus seems that the protest history in Egypt 
which developed prior to the public uprisings against the authoritarian regime of Hosni 
Mubarak in spring 2011 had a positive impact on the latter's success in effecting regime 
change, while the prospect of the current protests in Syria to effect regime change is lower as 
a similar protest history is missing there.
The correlation between our dependent variable and the independent variable "the 
degree of social media use” (IV-2) was much less obvious, albeit positive. Although the index 
used to assess social media use showed a higher value for Egypt, our case with a regime 
change, than for Syria, the difference in value points is marginal. It is difficult to draw any 
significant conclusion from this result with regard to the impact of social media on protests
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and their success in effecting regime change. Thus, the second hypothesis proposed, i.e. that 
the more social media tools are used in a given regime, the more successful political protests 
can be in effecting regime change, could not be strongly confirmed by our findings.
In conclusion, it seems obvious that the scope of this paper cannot serve to give a 
definitive answer to the question Why were the public uprisings in Egypt successful in 
effecting regime change, while those in Syria did not have a similar effect so far. Nevertheless 
it seems illuminative to apply the model of information cascades to the study of regime 
change in the two cases chosen, as it can enhance our perspectives to understand why 
protests led to a regime change in Egypt but not in Syria. The limited results of this study 
suggest that Susanne Lohmann's approach of analyzing the protest history of a country can 
still bear some fruits as a protest sequence before a given uprising may be of relevance to the 
latter's prospect to effect regime change.
Meanwhile, Clay Shirky's claim that social media improve information cascades cannot 
be verified, as it is neither supported nor refuted by our results, though we have to 
acknowledge that the design chosen to test this claim has its limitations. When analyzed in 
greater detail, the degree of social media use seems more developed -  and more political as 
well -  in Egypt than in Syria. Although social media was obviously used during protests in 
Egypt (in the past as well as in the spring of 2011), their impact on the protests' success in 
effecting regime change could not be elaborated upon in this paper and remains to be 
clarified in future researches.
Undoubtedly, much remains to be done on regime change, and social media -  and 
even more on the impact of the latter to contribute to the former. To do this effectively, 
research needs to be broadened and opened to combine several perspectives and 
methodological approaches. Meier rightly claims that the prevailing anecdotes in the field of 
social media research need to be balanced with large-N quantitative data. Yet this paper 
suggests that the qualitative aspect of research on social media matters as well, as we need 
to assess content, i.e. what social media is in fact used for. It seems equally important not to 
lose other more "traditional” media out of sight: the role of Al Jazeera in the Arab uprisings, for 
example, was neglected in this study, yet it seems to matter in the analysis of media's impact 
on the development of the protests as well.96 Other aspects may concern means to 
circumvent digital censorship, like the use of proxy technology, which reportedly increased
9 6  El Oifi, M. (2011, May). Der Al-Dschasira-Effekt. Le Monde Diplomatique (German Edition), May 2011,
9.
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fourfold in Egypt in the weeks leading to the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak.97 The model of 
information cascades itself could also be applied on a wider scale, with the aim to analyze 
how the successful Tunisian Revolution might have sparked an information cascade effecting 
uprisings in other Arab countries.98
Despite the shortcomings mentioned before, this paper's outcome seems to support 
the stand that a much broader time span needs to be considered when analyzing the effects 
of social media use, especially with regard to regime change, while the focus needs to be put 
on the process. Shirky himself points to what Lohmann's approach suggests to this regard: 
"that protests, when effective, are at the end of a long process, rather than a replacement for 
it” .99 The same may be said of the effects of social media use in any given country. There is 
still a lot of development potential of social media ahead of us. And yet, in their struggle for 
change, Arab populations in North Africa and the Middle East, while having been exposed to 
a relatively low degree of social media development, have nevertheless given the world a 
whole new perspective on its application and use. And as a former imprisoned blogger who is 
selected youth minister by the Tunisian interim government tweets cabinet meetings,100 these 
countries may even more importantly set new standards on how to benefit from social media 
and harvest the momentum of regime change.
9 7 Compare: Index on Censorship (2011, Mar. 11). Free Expression Awards 2011: New Media. Index on 
Censorship Homepage. Retrieved 15 April 2011 from <http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2011/03/free- 
expression-awards-2 0 1 1 -new-media/>.
9 8  Compare: Howard, P. (2011, Feb. 23). The Cascading Effects of the Arab Spring. Miller McCune 
Online. Retrieved 24 May 2011 from <http://www.miller-mccune.com/politics/the-cascading-effects-of- 
the-arab-spring-28575/>.
9 9  Shirky, The Net Advantage, para 26. Compare also: Seib, The A l Jazeera Effect, 111, and Olsson- 
Yaouzis, N. (2010, Dec.). An Evolutionary Dynamic of Revolutions. Public Choice, 11127, 1-19.
1 0 0  Compare: POMED (2011, Feb. 7). The Role of Citizen Journalism and Social Media in the Middle 
East and North Africa. Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED). Discussion at the National 
Democratic Institute, Washington, D. C; and: Sereni, J-P. (2011, May). Mit Ernst, Geduld und Mut. Le 
Monde Diplomatique (German Edition), May 2011, 8 .
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Annex 1: Detailed List of Manifested Protests Accounted for (2 Year-Period)
The following lists present the results for manifested protests in Egypt and Syria 
accounted for through a LexisNexis database research. The following were the coded search 
parameters:
•  search terms (respectively): "protest in Egypt” // "protest in Syria”;
•  sources: "press -  all languages” ;
•  date: "from 1. January 2009 to 1. January 2011” ;
•  controlling with search terms (respectively) (otherwise same search parameters): 
"demonstration in Egypt” // "demonstration in Syria”.
Example: 
( 0  LexisNexis
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Results for Egypt:
EGYPT
DATE SOURCE TITLE OF ARTICLE NUMBER 
OF PRO­
TESTERS
ADD. INFORMATION 
(REASON FOR/AIM OF PROTEST)
Apr 7, 
2009
Inter Press 
Service
Egypt: Online group 
stages “Day of 
Anger” over prices, 
politics
“several 
hundred” to 
3,000
“Day of Anger”: April 6  Movement. 
Demonstrations across the country, initially 
organized by an Internet-based activist 
group, The April 6  Youth, using Facebook. 
The group also issued a list of basic 
demands, some economic and some 
political. The call to action was endorsed by 
most of Egypt's opposition parties, including 
the Muslim Brotherhood.
Jul 16, 
2009
Associated
Press
Worldstream
Fifteen people 
injured in protest in 
Egypt
3,000 Clashes between police and thousands of 
quarry workers in the south of Egypt 
demonstrating against government plans to 
raise extraction costs.
Apr 6 , 
2 0 1 0
UPI Security forces quell 
Cairo protests
n/a Security forces in Cairo scuffled with pro­
democracy groups calling for democratic 
reform in front of the upper house of 
Parliament. Protests broke out in other parts 
of Egypt, including Alexandria.
Jul 25, 
2 0 1 0
UPI “Down with 
Mubarak”, 
protesters chant
4,000 Death of Khaled Mohammed Said at the 
hand of police officers prompted widespread 
public protests in Egypt.
Nov
29,
2 0 1 0
The Press 
Trust of India
Counting of votes 
underway amid 
opposition protests 
in Egypt
n/a Counting of votes from the controversial 
parliamentary elections in Egypt amid 
Opposition charges of ballot fraud and 
protests at various locations.
Dec
13,
2 0 1 0
The
Associated
Press
Egypt protesters 
say new parliament 
is “void”
“hundreds” Opposition activists protested outside the 
Supreme Court in downtown Cairo over 
bogus elections.
Results for Syria:
SYRIA
DATE SOURCE TITLE OF ARTICLE NUMBER 
OF PRO­
TESTERS
ADD. INFORMATION 
(REASON FOR/AIM OF PROTEST)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
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Annex 2: Detailed List of Manifested Protests Accounted for (6 Year-Period)
The following lists present the results for manifested protests in Egypt and Syria 
accounted for through a LexisNexis database research. The following were the coded search 
parameters:
•  search terms (respectively): "protest in Egypt” // "protest in Syria” ;
•  sources: "press -  all languages” ;
•  date: “ from  1. January 2005 to  1. January 2011” ;
•  controlling with search terms (respectively) (otherwise same search parameters): 
"demonstration in Egypt” // "demonstration in Syria”.
Example:
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Results for Egypt:
EGYPT
DATE SOURCE TITLE OF 
ARTICLE
NUMBER 
OF PRO­
TESTERS
ADD. INFORMATION 
(REASON FOR/AIM OF PROTEST)
May 4, 
2005
Associated 
Press Online
Banned Islamic 
group protests in 
Egypt
"thousands” Organized by the Muslim Brotherhood, 
demanding political reform. 77th birthday of 
President Hosni Mubarak.
May 29, 
2005
Agence 
France 
Presse - 
English
Egypt accuses 
foreign media of 
exaggerating vote 
violence
n/a Constitutional Referendum on May 25. "A 
wave of pro-reform protests in Egypt in the 
weeks leading up to the election”.
May 30, 
2005
Agence 
France 
Presse - 
English
Egyptian women 
demand Mubarak 
apology over vote 
violence
n/a Female activists protesting against the 
nature of the constitutional referendum 
submitted to Egyptians on May 25, as well 
as against "police brutality, beating and 
sexual harassment” of several women during 
the referendum.
Jul 5, 
2005
AP
Worldstream
Families of 
detained Muslim 
Brotherhood 
members stage 
protest in Egypt
2 0 0 Relatives of 1,200 detained Muslim 
Brotherhood members stage a peaceful sit- 
in outside the state prosecutor's office in 
Cairo demanding their release.
Jul 22, 
2005
The
Associated
Press
Mubarak casts 
himself as 
guarantor of 
Egypt's stability 
ahead of election
n/a An unprecedented series of small but highly 
vocal protests in Egypt in recent months 
have demanded greater democratic reforms 
while seeking an end to Mubarak's rule.
Aug 25, 
2005
US Fed 
News
Egypt's Kifaya 
protests keep 
pressure on 
Mubarak
fewer than 
2 0 0
Dozens of protests in the last several 
months by the "Kifaya” movement. Anti­
government protests in Egypt are keeping 
pressure on the government of President 
Mubarak as the country prepares 
presidential election.
Sept
27,
2005
AP
Worldstream
Mubarak sworn in 
for a new term, 
promises more 
reform
2 , 0 0 0 Opposition activists stage a noisy anti­
Mubarak protest in downtown Cairo.
May 25, 
2006
US Fed 
News
VOA news: Police 
crackdown follows 
peaceful protests 
in Egypt
300+ Pro-reform judges stood in silent protest 
outside the high court, demanding an end to 
government interference in the judiciary 
while several other peaceful protests also 
took place in Cairo
Apr 27, 
2007
Targeted
News
Service
Egyptian 
Government 
Should Reverse Its 
Order to Close 
CTUWS Offices
1,300 Textile workers in Suez went on strike to ask 
for wages they said management had not 
paid. More than 20,000 workers eventually 
went on strike until the government offered 
them an increased bonus.
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May 15, 
2007
IPS
(Latin
America)
Spate of strikes 
and protests in 
Egypt;
Egypt: Labour 
Unrest Spreads
3,000 Employees of the state-run Transportation 
Authority threaten a general strike.
Apr 2, 
2008
ABC
Premium
News
(Australia)
Egyptian elections 
under scrutiny after 
candidate arrests
"hundreds” Muslim Brotherhood supporters take to the 
streets to protest against arrests of co­
supporters by the regime.
Apr 7, 
2009
IPS Egypt: Online 
group stages "Day 
of Anger” over 
prices, politics
"several 
hundred” to 
3,000
"Day of Anger”: April 6  Movement. 
Demonstrations across the country, initially 
organized by an Internet-based activist 
group, The April 6  Youth, using Facebook. 
The group also issued a list of basic 
demands, some economic and some 
political. The call to action was endorsed by 
most of Egypt's opposition parties, including 
the Muslim Brotherhood.
Jul 16, 
2009
Associated
Press
Worldstream
Fifteen people 
injured in protest in 
Egypt
3,000 Clashes between police and thousands of 
quarry workers in the south of Egypt 
demonstrating against government plans to 
raise extraction costs.
Apr 6 , 
2 0 1 0
UPI Security forces 
quell Cairo 
protests
n/a Security forces in Cairo scuffled with pro­
democracy groups calling for democratic 
reform in front of the upper house of 
Parliament. Protests broke out in other parts 
of Egypt, including Alexandria.
Jul 25, 
2 0 1 0
UPI "Down with 
Mubarak”, 
protesters chant
4,000 Death of Khaled Mohammed Said at the 
hand of police officers prompted widespread 
public protests in Egypt.
Nov 29, 
2 0 1 0
The Press 
Trust of 
India
Counting of votes 
underway amid 
opposition protests 
in Egypt
n/a Counting of votes from the controversial 
parliamentary elections in Egypt amid 
opposition charges of ballot fraud and 
protests at various locations.
Dec 13, 
2 0 1 0
The
Associated
Press
Egypt protesters 
say new
parliament is "void”
"hundreds” Opposition activists protested outside the 
Supreme Court in downtown Cairo over 
bogus elections.
Results for Syria:
SYRIA
DATE SOURCE TITLE OF ARTICLE NUMBER OF 
PRO­
TESTERS
ADD. INFORMATION (REASON FOR/AIM 
OF PROTEST)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
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Annex 3: Detailed Calculation of the aDAI, Including Sources
The following chart is based on the calculation and presentation of results of the 
original DAI, as compiled by the International Telecommunication Union (2003). Data is taken 
from a set of different sources (compare „Sources“ below) covering the years between 2008 
and 2011.
On its webpage, the International Telecommunication Union gives following „Digital 
Access Index Technical Note“, equally valid for the calculation of the aDAI:
The Digital Access Index (DAI) measures the overall ability of individuals 
in a country to access and use Information and Communication 
Technology. It consists of eight variables organized into five categories. 
Each variable is converted to an indicator with a value between zero and 
one by dividing it by the maximum value or "goalpost". Each indicator is 
then weighted within its category and the resulting category index values 
are averaged to obtain the overall DAI value.102
Calculation for Egypt:
Category Variable
1 .
Infrastruct
ure
2 .
1. Fixed telephone 
subscribers per 
1 0 0  inhabitants
2. Mobile cellular 
subscribers per 
1 0 0  inhabitants
3. Adult Literacy
Knowledg 4 . School 
e enrollment
3. Quality
5. International 
Internet bandwidth 
(bits) per capita
6 . Broadband 
subscribers per 
1 0 0  inhabitants
Values for 
Egypt Goal-post Indicator
12.421
66.691 /
71.42 /
76.43 /
1.331
60
1 0 0
1 0 0  =
1 0 0  =
332.12L / 10'000 =
30 =
0.207 *
0.667 * 
0.714 * 
0.764 *
Weight Category index
(1 /2 ) =
(1 /2 ) = 
(2/3) = 
(1/3) =
0.104
+ = 0.44 
0.334
0.476
+ = 0.73 
0.255
0.754a * (1 /2 ) = 0.377
+ = 0.40 
0.044 * (1 /2 ) = 0 . 0 2 2
/
/
1 0 2
International Telecommunication Union, ITU Digital Access Index. 
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4. Internet 7. Internet users 
Use per 100 inhabitants
8 . Facebook 
penetration per 
1 0 0  inhabitants
9. Facebook
5. Social P00etrtationtper 
Media Use 1 0 0  Internet users
24.261 /
5.49L / 
22.61L / 
0.019L /
85 =
60 = 
1 0 0  = 
1 1  =
0.29 *
0.092 * 
0.226 * 
0.0017 *
1 =
10. Estimated 
Number of 
bloggers per 1 0 0  
inhabitants
Egypt Digital Access Index (Average of 5 categories above)
(1/4)
(1/4)
(1 /2 )
Calculation for Syria:
Category
1 .
Infrastructu
re
2 .
Knowledge
3. Quality
4. Internet 
Use
Variable
1. Fixed telephone 
subscribers per 
1 0 0  inhabitants
2. Mobile cellular 
subscribers per 
1 0 0  inhabitants
3. Adult Literacy
4. School 
enrollment
5. International 
Internet
bandwidth (bits) 
per capita
6 . Broadband 
subscribers per 
1 0 0  inhabitants
7. Internet users 
per 1 0 0  
inhabitants
Values for
Syria Goal-post Indicator Weight
17.671 /
45.571 / 
79.62  / 
65.73 /
98.9L /
0.161 /
20.401 /
60 _
1 0 0  _ 
1 0 0  = 
1 0 0  =
1 0 ' 0 0 0  = 
30 =
85
0.295 *
0.456 * 
0.796 * 
0.657 *
0.67a * 
0.005 *
0.24 *
(1 /2 ) =
(1 /2 ) = 
(2/3) = 
(1/3) =
(1 /2 ) = 
(1 /2 ) =
1 =
0.29
0.023
+
0.0565 = 0.08 
+
0.00085
0.39
Category index
0.147
+ = 0.38 
0.228
0.531
+ = 0.75 
0.219
0.335
+ = 0.34 
0.003
0.24
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8 . Facebook
penetration per 
1 0 0  inhabitants 1.07L / 60 = 0.017 * (1/4) = 0.0043
9. Facebook +
5. Social 
Media Use
penetration per 
100 Internet users 
10. Estimated 
Number of 
bloggers per 1 0 0  
inhabitants
5.27L / 
0.003 /
L '
1 0 0  = 
1 1  =
0.053 * 
0.0003 *
(1/4) = 
(1 /2 ) =
0.0133
+
0.00015
Syria Digital Access Index (Average of 5 categories above)
Note: Because of the large spread of values among economies, a logarithm is used to calculate this 
value: (LOG (1'867) -  LOG (0.01)) / (LOG (10'000) -  LOG (0.01)) (see ITU 2003).
Sources:
1. International Telecommunication Union, ICT Statistics Database <http://www.itu.int/ITU- 
D/ICTEYE/Indicators/Indicators.aspx>.
2. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- 
factbook/geos/sy.html>.
3: United Nations, Human Development Report 2009 <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/90.html>. 
4: Trading Economics (2011). International Internet Bandwidth (Bits per Person) in Egypt. Trading 
Economics Homepage. Retrieved 2 April 2011 from
<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/egypt/international-internet-bandwidth-bits-per-person-wb-
data.html>.
5: Arab Social Media Report (ASMR): Mourtada & Salem, Facebook Usage: Factors and Analysis 
<http://www.dsg.ae/NEWSANDEVENTS/UpcomingEvents/ASMRHome.aspx>.
6 : Open Net Initiative, Internet Filtering in Egypt (data for 2008), 
<http://opennet.net/research/profiles/egypt>.
7: UNDP-POGAR: United Nations, Arab Statistics (data for 2008),
<http://www.arabstats.org/country.asp?cid=19&ind=319&gid=4&sgid=35>.
8 : Personal Correspondence with Syrian News Wire-Blogger
"Sasa”<http://newsfromsyria.com/2006/03/14/building-syrian-blogosphere-syria-planet/> and with 
Maha Taki, PhD Candidate at the Media and Communications Research Institute (CAMRI), Univ. of 
Westminster
<http://blogs.nyu.edu/projects/materialworld/2009/09/bloggers_and_the_blogosphere_i.html>.
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